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Abstract _ 
Vertical and horizontal equity principies occupy the core of income tax systems evaluation. 
Vertical inequality is measured in terms of relative or absolute income inequality indices, as in 
the analysis of the redistributive effects (RE) of progressive tax systems. Horizontal equity 
measurement has been more controversial. Classical horizontal inequities (HI), undestood as 
unequal treatment of equals or close similars, should be distinguished from reranking (RKG) 
caused by equity and non equity tax breaks, in actual tax schemes. We propose to integrate the 
measurement of RE, HI, and RKG in a social welfare framework where tax units non-income 
differences in needs are recognized. Additively decomposable measurement instruments by 
population subgroup are found essential to clarify the issues involved. 
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INTRODUcnON 
Income tax systems have been often evaluated in the light of the 
classical principIes of horizontal and vertical equity which demand, 
respectively, equal treatment of equals and different treatment of 
unequals. The satisfaction of vertical equity, has been generally identified 
with an improvement in either relative or absolute inequality in an 
appropiate income space. However, the application of the principIe of 
horizontal equity has been more controversia!. The first difficulty is that, 
in practice, few people are found in identical circumstances. 
Two solutions have been proposed. Sorne authors have been 
content with widening the notion of "exact equals" to "close similars" in 
empirical work. Admitedly, to implement any definition of close similars 
is a thorny issue. But it can be done(l). Therefore, we reserve the term 
horizontal inequities (HI for short) to denote situations in which identical 
(or similar) individuals pay different taxes. 
Other authors have prefered to substitute for the original idea by 
identifying the maintenance of horizontal equity with the preservation of 
the ranking in the before tax distribution. The extent of horizontal 
inequity is then measured as a function of the number of rank reversals(2). 
IndependentIy of whether the reranking caused by a tax scheme (RKG for 
short) should be considered a horizontal or a vertical phenomenon, we 
agree with Plotnik (1982) that the measurement of RKG has an interest of 
its own. In any case, it is clear that HI are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for RKG. Hence, both phenomena should be conceptually distinguished 
and subject to independent measurement. 
The source of the second difficulty, líes in the notion of equals i!, a 
heterogenous world, the need for interpersonal welfare comparisons, ttnd 
the ways in which tax systems are actually designed. To see this, assume 
for a moment that, from a social point of view, all individuals have the 
same needs. It is well known(3) that relative (absolute) income inequality 
is unambigously reduced if, and only if, average tax líability (tax liability) is 
increasing with income. We refer to this as the redistributive effect (RE for 
short) of a progressive tax system in the relative or the absolute case. 
In this homogeneous world, individuals with the same income 
will be taxed equally, so that no HI are possible. If, in addition, marginal 
rates are less than one, there can be no RKG either. But actual tax systems 
al10w for a variety of tax exemptions on account of income source, 
housing tenure, financial or cultural investments, etc. However legitimate 
their respective aims from other points of view, these exemptions will 
have a twofold impact: (i) they will affect the RE of a progressive income 
tax in a manner that cannot be signed a priori; (ti) and they may very well 
create HI, RKG or both. 
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Let us now recognize that households and families are typically 
heterogeneous: they differ not only in income, but in non-income 
characteristics which give rise to differences in needs. In an income tax 
context, we will take as our primitive notion the tax unit, consisting of the 
taxpayer together with the non-earning dependents (children, 
handicapped, or the aged) claimed to be under his/her responsability. Tax 
units of the same size are assumed to have identical needs and, therefore, 
welfare comparisons through their incomes can be directly performed. 
Since this is not the case for differently sized units, sorne notion of 
adjusted or equivalent income may be introduced to perform welfare 
comparisons between them. 
Intuitively, tax deductions for dependents are not meant to create 
HI. On the contrary, they arise from the realization that to establish who 
are the equals we must go beyond income to include a demographic 
dimensiono Implicit in any tax code, there is what we will call a fiscal 
equivalence scale, usually independent on income: all tax units with 
identical ethically relevant characteristics are granted the same tax break. 
However, rather than applying progressive tax rates to income 
adjusted for dependents according to such fiscal scale, actual systems apply 
progressive tax rates to unadjusted incomes and then allow a dependents 
exemption. This practice, as well as discrepancies between the fiscal scale 
and other alternative scales an analyst may care to use, create HI which 
must be taken into account when assessing the tax system's impact on 
social welfare. 
Such HI is an avoidable feature of actual tax systems. We will show 
how ít disappears as soon as we do away with tax allowances for 
dependents but apply the progressive tariff on adjusted income. The only 
question left, will be the empírical one of searching for a range of new 
fiscal scales which permit to achieve at least the same social welfare as :the 
standard tax system. 
We propose to integrate the measurement of HI, RKG and RE in a 
social welfare framework where all the normative aspects are made 
explicito We will remain within the tradition where social or aggregate 
welfare is summarized by two statistics of the adjusted income 
distribution: the mean, and an index of vertical inequality. After tax social 
welfare will be compared to the before tax situation where all income is in 
tax units hands. We will address the following three issues: 
(1) As far as the measurement of the RE effect, we simply keep 
separate the impact on social welfare of: i) the progressive tariff; ii) 
dependent allowances justified on equity reasons; and iii) other fiscal 
exemptions justified on other grounds. Lacking evidence in favor of a 
particular standard of comparison, we follow Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b) 
and parametrize the value judgements implicit in the definition of 
adjusted income(4). Combining such parametrization with additively 
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separable social evaluation functions, we will be able to keep track of 
within- and between-groups RE effects in the ethically relevant partition 
by tax unit size. 
(2) We do not introduce explicit value judgements on the 
deleterious effects of c1assical HI. Instead, we follow Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert (1994) and, above all, Lambert and Ramos (1994), applying 
decomposable vertical measures to the partition of exact equals (or c10se 
similars in empirical applications) in adjusted income space(S). We 
distinguish between HI created by equity deductions for dependents, and 
HI caused by non equity based exemptions. 
(3) Contrary to King (1983) or Plotnik (1982, 1985), we do not 
introduce explicit value judgements on the bad aspects of RKG. Consider, 
for instance, the impact of non equity deductions. If they cause RKG, it 
must be because sorne poor tax units are allowed greater tax breaks than 
richer ones. This increases the overall progressivity of the tax system. To 
assess the RKG importance, we suggest a novel method to estimate the 
"progressivity savings" which willlead to the same social welfare and tax 
revenue without reranking. 
We believe that the additive separability property of the 
measurement instrument is essential to c1arify the distinction between 
welfare comparisons across households with different needs, and the 
impact of a progressive tariff and deductions of all sorts on both RE, RKG 
and HI. Fortunately, as reviewed in Ruiz-Castillo (1995), when we add this 
property to the usual ones and require that welfare within each group be 
weighted by population shares, we end up with the Kolm-Pollak family of 
social evaluation functions in the absolute case, and a single member of 
the general entropy family in the relative case. Although in this context 
we prefer an absolute notion of vertical inequality, we treat the relative 
case as well. . 
A final word is in order. Like any other measurement approach, 
this has to be tested in empirical work. This is currently the subject of 
independent research. 
The rest of the paper is organized in three sections. The first one 
presents notation and a statement of the social evaluation problem. The 
second section, which is central to the paper, is devoted to the absolute 
case. In the first place, we study RE, HI and RKG resulting from 
progressive tax rates on original incomes, equity deductions, and tax 
exemptions on grounds other than equity. In the second place, actual 
practice is compared to the dismissal of dependent allowances and the 
application of tax rates on adjusted rather than original income: as in the 
homogeneous case, no HI or RKG is then possible. Finally, we study the 
consequences of eliminating HI caused by tax breaks from non equity 
deductions. The third section briefly reviews these topics in the relative 
case. 
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1. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
 
1.1. Welfare comparisons between heterogeneous tax units 
Assume we have a heterogeneous populati?n of i = l, ...,N tax 
units, which may differ in their income before taxes Xl and/ or the number 
of dependents di. Since all tax units are headed by a person known as the 
taxpayer, tax unit size is equal to di+ 1. 
As in Pollak and Wales (1979), tax units are endowed with a 
common unconditional utility function defined on commodities and 
ethically relevant characteristics, tax unit size in our contexto Omiting 
prices, which remain constant in the sequel, indirect utility is given by 
. Naturally, original incomes xi and xj are non comparable unless di 
=dJ. Otherwise, one can define adjusted or equivalent income as 
where (di + 1)8 is interpreted as the number of equivalent taxpayers in the 
tax unit, and 8 is a parameter indicating the importance we are prepared 
to give to economies of scale in consumption: the greater 8 is, the smaller 
the economies of scale, and the doser adjusted income becomes to income 
per capita. Thus, xi(8) is the income necessary for a reference taxpayer to 
enjoy the utility level ui =<p(xi, di + 1). " 
Alternatively, adjusted income can be defined as 
where the parameter '" can be interpreted as the cost of a reference 
taxpayer, so that ",di is the income we can subtract from a tax unit of size di 
+ 1 for a reference taxpayer to enjoy the utility level ui = <p(xi, di + 1) with 
the remaining income. 
Under certain conditions on tax unit preferences reviewed in 
Ruiz-Castillo (1995), 
or 
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Therefore income adjusted for non-income needs in either of these two 
polar forms provides a comparable indicator of tax unit welfare. 
1.2. Social Evaluation Functions(6) 
A Social Evaluation Function (SEF) is a real valued function W 
defined in the space RN of adjusted incomes, with the interpretation that 
for each income distribution, say r = (rl,...,~), W(r) provides the "social" 
or, simply, the aggregate welfare from a normative point of view. 
Consider the following axiom set on W covering both a relative 
and an absolute concept of vertical inequality: A.1 S-concavity; A.2 
continuity; A.3 population replication invariance; plus A.4R weak­
homotheticity and A.SR monotonicity along rays from the origin, in the 
relative case; or A.4A weak-translability and A.SA monotonicity along 
rays parallel to the line of equality, in the absolute case. Under these 
conditions, there exists a unique function H such that 
W (r) =H(~(r), Ver»~, 
where ~ is the function giving the mean, V an index of vertical relative or 
absolute inequality, and H is increasing in its first argument and 
decreasing in the second. 
We are interested in complete quantitative assessments of welfare 
change and its decomposition into changes in the mean and changes in 
either relative or absolute inequality. For that purpose, we have to be more 
specific about the trade-off between efficiency and distributional 
considerations. We will consider the multiplicative case 
W (r) = ~(r) [1- I(r»1 
where 1 is an index of relative inequality, and the additive case 
W (r) = ~(r) - A(r), 
where A stands for an index of absolute inequality. 
On the other hand, for any partition of the population, we are also 
interested in welfare measures capable of distinguishing -in a convenient 
additive way- between two components: welfare within the subgroups, 
and the 1055 of welfare due to inequality between the subgroups. Without 
loss of generality, let us choose the partition by tax unit 5ize into m = 1,...,M 
subgroups. 
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Consider first the relative case and define between-group 
inequality as the inequality remaining after removing aH within-group 
inequality by assigning each tax unit her subgroup mean, that is, the 
inequality oí the distribution J-t* = (J-tl,...,J-tM) where, íor each m, 
m Nm Nm Nm J-t = (J-t(r~.l ), 1 =(1,...,l)ER , 
and :I~m = N. Then, one investigates under what conditions overaH 
inequality can be expressed as . 
(1) 
where the weights amare íunctions only oí the set oí subgroup means and 
sizes. If these weights are subgroup shares in total income, then we have 
This is a useíul expression, indicating that aggregate welfare can be 
expressed as a weighted average oí the welfare within each subgroup, with 
weights equal to population shares, minus the between-group inequality 
weighted by the population mean. Although aH the members oí the 
generalized entropy íamily oí relative inequality indices admit the 
decomposition oí equation (1), only the first Theil index 
has the required properties, so that 
Blackorby, Donaldson and Auersperg (1981) define between-group 
inequality as the inequality that would result if each household received 
her subgroup's equaHy-distributed-equivalent-income (EDEI) ~m. The 
separability conditions required to estimate the EDEI oí any subgroup in 
any partition independentIy oí the rest oí the distribution, combined with 
assumptions A.l, A.2, and A.5A íor a translatable W, lead to the Kolm­
PoHak íamily: 
Wlr) = - [l/y] ln[(l/N):I¡ e - y ri], y> O, 
where y is interpreted as an aversion to inequality parameter: as y 
increases, the social indifíerence curves show increasing curvature until 
only the income oí the poorest person matters. An index oí absolute 
inequality consistent with W isy 
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Alr) = [1/y] In [(1/N)L¡ e y (J.t(r) - r1)], y> O. 
Since 
* Ay(r) = Lm[Nm/NJAy(r"') + Ay(; ), 
where 
Nm;* = (;1,...,;M), ;m = (;(r"').l ), m= 1,...,M, 
we have 
This is an appealing decomposition, in which social welfare is seen to be 
equal to the weighted average of the aggregate welfare within each of the 
subgroups, with weights equal to population shares, minus the inequality 
between the subgroups. 
We must reca11 that, in our definition of adjusted income, we 
have parametrized the weight we are prepared to give to the economies of 
scale in consumption achieved by tax units. Aggregate welfare in the 
relative case will be 
W 1(x(8» = Lm[Nm/N][W1(Xm)!m8] - J.t(x(8»I1(J.t* (8», 
where for each m 
In the absolute case, 
where d =Lidi is the total number of dependents and, for each m, 
1.3. Tax systems 
A tax system is a triple < P, D1 ' D2 >, where P is an income tax 
function defined on the positive real numbers, D1 is a rule which gives a 
general deduction to a11 taxpayers and a tax allowance for each dependent, 
and D2 is a rule which gives a11 other tax exemptions as a function of the 
tax unit status in regard to income source, housing tenure and other 
characteristics. 
We are given an actual tax system where the function P is said to 
be progressive because average and absolute tax rates are increasing, and 
where marginal tax rates are less than one so that there can be no 
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rerankings from the operation of the tariff. Moreover, we will assume that 
DI is a linear function 
D~ =a (di+ 1), i = 1,...,N, 
according to which a11 tax unit members are treated equa11y. We will refer 
to the parameter a as the implicit fiscal scale. 
Denote by Ti income taxes actually paid. Since tax rates are 
assumed to apply to original incomes, 
Define after tax income as 
It will be useful to define also income before deductions 
and income zi and taxes T~ after equity related deductions 
i i i i i i 
z =y + DI' TI = P(x ) - DI' 
so that 
We will denote the corresponding vectors by 
1 n 1 n 1 n 1 nT = (T ,...,T), P(x) = (P(x ),...,P(x )), 01 =(DI,···,DI ), 02 = (D2,···,D2 ), 
where
 
y = x - P(x), z = y + D¡ , v = z + ° 2 , T = P(x) - D¡ - 02 .
 
For any vector r = (rI,...,rn ), we will use the notation 
so that, for instance, o(P(x)) would be total tax revenue accruing from the 
tax on original income, while o(T) < o(P(x)) is actual tax revenue after 
a110wances of a11 types. 
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1.4. The social evaluation problem 
Given a SEF W, social welfare before taxes is W (x(·», while welfare 
after taxes is W(v(·». Therefore, the welfare change induced by the tax 
system in the relative case will be 
Taking into account that 
we have 
aRW (8) =RE(8) - ~(T(8»[1- I1(v(8»] 
where 
is the RE of an actual income tax system, measured by the change in an 
index of vertical inequality before and after taxes, weighted in this context 
by mean income before taxes. 
Similarly, in the absolute case the welfare change induced by the 
tax system will be 
Since 
W y(.) = ~(.) - Ay(.), 
we have 
aAW(A) =RE(A) - ~(T) 
where 
RE(A) =Ay<X(A» - Ay(V(A» 
is the RE of an actual income tax system. 
In both cases, there appears a negative term which captures tax 
revenues or, what is the same, the disposable income reduction in tax 
units hands. This welfare loss may or may not be offset by the benefits 
-and its distribution across tax units- which the public sector might give 
rise to via transfers or public expenditure, an activity beyond this paper's 
scope. 
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11. THE ABSOLUTE CASE 
11.1. RE of an actual tax system 
In the first place, we investigate the impact of a progressive tax 
system on original income. For that purpose, we apply the absolute 
inequality index's additive separability property to the partition by tax unit 
size in 
REn (A) = Ay(X(A» - Ay(y(A» 
* * 
= Im[Nm/N] [AlX~ -Ay(yffi)] + [Ay(Sxm(A» - Ay(Sym(A»] 
where, for example, 
* 1 M m Nm Nm Nm Sxm(A) =(S;(A),...,S; (A», Sx (A)= (S(x~A».l ), and 1 =(l,...,l)ER . 
Notice that REn(A) has been broken down into two terms. The first is the 
sum of redistributive effects within each subgroup m, weighted by 
population shares. Vertical inequality improves within each subgroup. 
Therefore, the first term as a whole, which is independent of A, must be 
positive. The second term is the change in inequality between groups. 
Whether or not a progressive tariff imposed on original income improves 
absolute inequality between groups is an empirical question. In any case, 
the magnitude of the change depends on the value judgements 
surnmarized by A. 
In the second place, we investigate the impact of tax al10wances for 
dependents and taxpayers. Consider the expression 
* * 
Im[Nm/N] [Alyffi) -Ay(z~] + [AlSym(A» - Ay(Szm(A»]. 
For any i with tax unit size equal to m, 
Therefore, for each m, 
Hence 
* * 
REI2(A) = Ay(Sym(A» -Ay(Szm(A». 
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That is, the redistributive effect oí equity deductions is only the change in 
between-groups inequality when we go írom distribution Y(A) to 
distribution z(A). The sign, oí course, is unknown a priori. 
In the third place, we investigate the impact oí other exemptions. 
Consider the expression 
REn(A) = Ay(z(A» - Ay(v(A» = 
* * 
:I:m[Nm/N] [Ay(zm) -Ay(v~] + [Ai;zm(A» - Ay(~m(A»]. 
None oí the two terms oí this decomposition can be signed a priori. 
Collecting terms, the welfare change induced by an actual tax 
system in the absolute case is seen to be 
b.AW(A) =REn(A) + REI2(A) + RE¡¡(A) - ~(T) 
* * 
- :I:m[Nm/N] [Aix"') - Ay(v"')] + [Ai;xm(A» - Ay(~m(A» - ~(T). 
11.2. HI of an actual tax system 
Consider now the partition by exact equals, e = 1,...,E in the 
distribution by beíore tax a~justed income. We will apply the additive 
separability property to the three RE expressions already stud~ed, 
beginning with 
REIl (A) = Ay(x(A» - Ay(Y(A» = 
* * 
:I:e [NeIN] [Aixe(A» - Ay(r(A»] + [Ai;xe(A» - Ay(~(A»] 
where, íor example, 
and :I: Ne= N. Since all tax units belonging to subgroup e are exact equals, e

we have that Ay(xe(A» = O. Thereíore,
 
REn (A) =HIn(A) + VIl(A),
 
where
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Hln{A) =-~e [NeIN] Ay{f{A)) < O 
measures HI created because the tariff is applied to unadjusted income, 
while 
* * Vn (A) =Ay{~xe{A)) - Ay{y{A)) 
is the pure vertical effect induced by the tax. We expect Vn{A) > Ofor aH A. 
In the second place, 
* * RE¡2{A) = ~e [NeIN] [Ay{f{A)) - Ay{Ze{A))] + [AY<y{A)) - Ay{~ze{A))] 
so that 
RE¡{A) =REn{A) + RE¡2{A) =HI¡{A) + V¡{A), 
where 
and 
* * 
V¡(A) = [AY{~xe{A)) - Ay{~ze{A))]. 
The negative term HI¡{A) measures HI created by the double feature of 
actual tax systems: tariff exaction on original incomes, plus compensatory 
tax dependent allowances. In absolute value, we expect HI¡{A) < HIn(A). 
The term V¡{A) measures the combined vertical effect induced by these 
two features. 
In a similar vein, the second round of deductions gives rise to the 
following decomposition: 
* * REn{A) =~e [NeIN] [Alze{A)) - Ay{Ve{A))] + [Al~ze{A)) - Ay{~ve{A))]. 
Notice that, for any e, nothing can be said a priori about the sign of 
Ay{Ze{A)) - Ay{Ve{A))]. Therefore, in the expression 
REn{A) = HIn{A) + Vn{A), 
where 
and 
* * 
Vn{A) =Ay{~ze{A)) - Ay{~e{A)) 
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neither of the two terms can be signed a priori. This simply reflects the fact 
that whether this type of HI generates a progressive or a regressive impact 
is an empirical question. 
Collecting terms, we have 
AAW(A) =RE(A) - f.1(T) =HI(A) + V(A) - f.1(T) 
where 
and 
* * V(A) = V1(A) + Vu(A) =Ay(Sxe(A» - Ay(Sve(A». 
11.3. RKG of an actual tax system 
Suppose that v(A) and x(A) are not equally ordered. Consider the 
permutation v '(A) of v(A) which orders all tax units as in x(A). For every i 
and every A, define total taxes 
ClearIy, for every A
 
W(v'(A» = W(v(A»
 
and
 
o(T '(A» =a(T).
 
That is, for every A the tax vector T'(A) raises the same revenue as T, and 
leads to the same after tax welfare as v(A). 
Our index of RKG will be: 
RKG(A) =Ay(T) - Ay(T'(A». 
11.4. Empirical questions 
(1) We are interested in studying the robustness of our estimates 
to variations in the generosity of the scale used to define adjusted income. 
Thus, in the first place, we want to study reranking, horizontal and 
vertical effects, redistributive effects of different sorts, and the change in 
absolute welfare as a function of A. 
(2) In particular, we want to study the consequences of adopting 
the fiscal scale in the valuation exercise, that is, we want to study the case 
13 
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in which A= a. When we agree to make aH evaluations at the fiscal scale, 
we have for every i 
so that, for every e we will have 
Ay(ze(a» = Ay(f(a» > O. 
Therefore, 
llln(a) = HI¡(a) = -l:e [NeIN] Ay(f(a» < O. 
That is, there remains only the ID created by the application of the tariff to 
original rather than adjusted income. 
(3) Presumably, everyone would agree that, ceteris paribus, 
supressing HI is better. In our framework this must mean that supressing 
HI willlead to greater social welfare. 
We investigate this question in two steps. In the first place, by 
discarding aH dependents aHowances, maintaining the general exemption 
on taxpayers, and applying the given progressive tax function P to 
adjusted income. In the second place, we will study HI created by non­
equity deductions. 
For each i and Adefine taxes 
T~(A) = P(Xi(A» - A 
and after tax income 
Welfare change before the second round of deductions will be 
* * ~A W¡ (A) = Wy<Y(A» - Wy<X(A» =RE¡ (A) - J1(Tl(A» 
where 
* RE¡ (A) = Ay<X(A» - Ay(Y(A». 
Clearly, tax units in income-dependents space pay identical taxes, 
so that there is no HI and aH redistributive effect is of the vertical sort. 
Such effect can be broken down into 
* * * RE¡ (A) =l:m[Nm/N] [Ay<XnxA» - Ay(ynxA»] + [Ay<Sxm(A» - Ay(Sym(A»] 
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But the interesting question is: does there exist a set of values of A for 
which 
* * AA W (A) = REI (A) - J.t(T1(A» > AA WI(A) = REI(A) - J.t(T1)I 
where 
REI(A) = REn (A) + REI2(A) =Ay(Y(A» - Ay(x(A»? 
If so, is a in this set? Moreover, are there values for which 
* REI (A) > RE1(A) and a(Tl(A» = o(fl)· 
Otherwise, if we want to supress this type of HI and at least maintain 
social welfare, we will be forced to change the tax funtion P. 
(4) To complete the exercise, we must add the second round of 
deductions. Define total taxes Ti(A) and after tax adjusted income fÍ(A) by 
and 
respectively. Then 
* * AA WII(A) = Wy<f(A» - Wy(Y(A» = REII(A) - J.t(D2) 
where 
* REII(A) = Ay<Y(A» - Ay(f(A». 
Non-equity deductions will surely give rise to HI. Taking into 
account the partition of x(A) by exact equals in e = l,...,E subgroups, we 
have 
* * * REII(A) =HIII(A) + VII(A)
 
where
 
* HlII(A) = -1:elNeIN] Ay(F(A»]
 
and
 
* * * 
V11(1..) =lAY<~ye(A» - Ay(~fe(A»]. 
* The question is: which will be the consequences of making Hln(A) 
= O? 5uppose we redistribute o(D;) equally among tax units in e. That is, 
define after tax income for each i in e by 
lS 
-----.-.-------~-----------__r_------------....,__------. 
Then for each e 
so that HI are eliminated. Thus, if we define 
** REn (A) =Ay(Y(A» - Ay(F(A» , 
then 
** HIn (A) = l:e[NeIN] [Ay(ye(A) - Ay(Fe(A»] - o 
and 
** * * Vn (A) =Ay(;ye(A» - Ay(;Fe(A» 
so that 
** ** 
* * * * * But the fact that HIn (A) = O, does not guarantee that RE (A) > REn(A). Then 
* 
reason is that if deductions had a regressive impact, i. e. REn(A) < O, then 
the supression of HI in this manner will typically lead to an even greater 
worsening of vertical inequality. 
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II. THE RELATIVE CASE 
1II.1. RE of an actual tax system 
In the first place, consider the impact of a progressive tax system 
on original incomes: 
where 
* L¡(8) = l:m[Nm/N] bl(P(x~8»][1- 11(rn> -I1(Jlym(8»], 
* * 
+ [JI(x~/m8][ll(Jlxm(8» - I1(Jlym(8»] 
and, for example, 
* 1 M m 8 NIn,. Nm NmJl (8) = (Jl (8),..·,Jl (8», J1x (8) = [JI(x~/ m ].1 J, 1 = (l,...,l)ER .xm x x 
The first expression is the welfare loss caused by the reduction in tax units 
disposable income. The second expression is the RE of the tax system, 
which is the sum of two terms: the weighted sum of redistributive effects 
within each subgroup m, plus the change in between-group inequality 
before and after tax, weighted by the before tax mean. 5ince 11(x~ > 11(yffi) 
for every m, the first term must be positive, but the sign and magnitude of 
the second term is not known a priori. 
In the second place, consider the impact of equity deductions: 
w1(z(8» - W1(y(8» = REI2(8) + G1(8), 
where 
G1(8» =l:m[Nm/N] [JI(~/m8][1- 11(zm) - 11(JI:m(8»], 
and 
The first expression is the welfare gain caused by the tax break accruing to 
tax units. The second expression is the RE caused by equity deductions. In 
the absolute case, equal equity deductions to aH tax units of a given size, 
did not change within-group inequality. Now we have 
17 
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for each m. Therefore, the first term in this expression is positive, although 
the second term cannot be signed a priori. 
In the third place, consider the impact of non equity deductions: 
where 
* G2(e» = 1:m[Nm/N] [~(~/me] [1- I1(v"') - I1{Jl. (e»],vm
and 
* * 
+ [~(z"')/me][ll(~zm(e» - Il(~vm(e»]. 
The first expression is the welfare gain caused by the second tax break 
accruing to tax uníts. The second expression is the RE caused by non equity 
deductions. In this case, neither of the two terms can be signed a priori. 
Finally, the aggregate welfare change can be expressed as 
ARW (e) = W1(v(e» - W1(x(e» = RE(e) - L(e) 
where 
and 
The first expression is the net welfare loss caused by the reduction in tax 
units disposable income. The second expression is the RE of the actual tax 
system as a whole, which is the sum of two terms neither of which can be 
signed a priori. 
18 
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111.2. HI of an actual tax system 
Consider now the partition by exact equals, e = 1,...,E in the 
distribution by before tax adjusted income. We will apply the additive 
separability property to the three expressions for welfare change already 
studied, beginning with 
W 1(y(8)) - W1(x(8)) = Hln (8) + Vn(A) - L 
H
1 (8), 
where 
L~(8) = 1:e [NeIN] [J.l(p(xe(8))] [1- 11(f) - 11(J.l~(8))], 
I-ll (8) = -1: [Ne IN] [J.l(xe(8))] 11(f(8)),n e 
* * V n(8) = [J.l(xe(8))][l1(J.l (8)) - 11(J.lye(8))]xe
and, for example, 
* 1 E e e Ne N e N e J.l (8) = (J.lX<8)'''',JAx(8)), JAx(8) = [J.l(x (8))].1 ), 1 = (1,...,1)ER • 
xe
The expression Hln(8) < 0, measures HI created because the tariff is 
applied to unadjusted income, while Vn (8) is the pure vertical effect 
induced by the tax. We expect Vn(8) > °for aH 8. 
In the second place, 
where 
and 
* * 
V 12(8) = [J.l(f(8))][l1(J.lye(8)) - 11(J.lze(8))], 
so that 
where 
and 
19 
The negative term HI1(8) measures HI created by the double feature of 
actual tax systems: tariff exaction on original incomes, plus compensatory 
tax dependent allowances. In absolute value, we expect HI1(8) < HIn(8). 
The term V1(8) measures the combined vertical effect induced by these 
two features. 
Similarly, non equity deductions give rise to the following 
decomposition: 
where 
and 
* * V 11(8) = [J,t(ve(8»][11Ü.t (8» - 11(J,tv e(8»].ze
Notice that neither of these two terms can be signed a priori. 
Collecting terms, we have 
=H1(8) + V(8) - LH(8)
 
where
 
* LH(8) =¡e [NeIN] [(T~(8»)] [1 - 11(ve) - 11(J,tve(8»] 
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11.3. RKG of an actual tax system 
Suppose that v(e) and x(e) are not equally ordered. Consider the 
permutation v '(e) of v(e) which orders aH tax units as in x(i..). For every i 
and every e, define total taxes 
., • t • 
TI (e) = vI (e) - xI(e). 
ClearIy, for every i.. 
w(v'(e» = W(v(e» 
and 
o(T'(e» =o(T). 
That is, for every i.. the tax vector T'(e) raises the same revenue as T, and 
leads to the same after welfare as v(e). 
Our index of RKG will be:
 
RKG(e) =Ay(T) - Ay(T'(e».
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NOTES 
(1) See, for instance, Berliant and Strauss (1985), Aronson et al 
(1994), Lambert and Ramos (1994), Camarero et al (1993), and Pazos et al 
(1994). 
(2) See, for instance, Feldstein (1976), Atkinson (1980), Plotnik 
(1982, 1985), and King (1983). 
(3) See, for instance, Jakobsson (1976) and Eichhorn et al (1984) for 
the relative case, and Moyes (1988) for the absolute case. 
(4) For other applications, see Ruiz-Castillo (1994a, 1994b) and, in 
an income tax context, Aronson et al (1994). 
(5) In this we differ from those who use indices of distributional 
change studied by Cowell (1980, 1985): Jenkins (1988) applies them to the 
original income in the ethically relevant partition (tax unit size in our 
case), while Camarero et al (1993) and Pazos et al (1994) apply them to 
income adjusted by a single equivalence scale in the partition by close 
similars. 
(6) See Ruiz-Castillo (1995) for a review of the material covered in 
this subsection. 
22 
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